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R. Miller Shows"5 was not followed, that is, of insisting that the
motion to dissolve be tried immediately before the merits proper
and that separate records be maintained.
John V. Parker*

Mineral Rights-Forced Pooling Under
Louisiana Act 157 of 1940
In the field of mineral law, private ownership and contractual rights and obligations have been increasingly subjected to
the needs of an advancing economy, a development typical of
modem law. The passage of Act 157 of 19401 began a new chapter in Louisiana mineral law and some significant problems
concerning the rights of landowners and owners of mineral rights
have arisen in the slightly more than a decade since the enactment of this statute.
This comment will not discuss the basic constitutional issues
of the act, which have already been well settled.2 One of the
most interesting problems in mineral conservation arises from
the authority conferred by the act on the commissioner of conservation to establish compulsory drilling and production units.3
This specific area is the main concern of this comment.
The overall purposes of this legislation and the resulting
orders of the commissioner are to obtain the maximum possible
production of oil and gas from underground pools and to prevent the drilling of unnecessary wells. The basis. of the unitization orders is that there is a coequal right in landowners whose
tracts cover a common pool to take from this source. Forced
pooling is used to protect these common owners. 4
58. 17 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 1944). See also Kavanaugh v. Frost-Johnson
Lbr. Co., 149 La. 972, 90 So. 275 (1921); Byrd v. Cooper, 166 La. 402, 117 So.
441 (1928); Albert Pick & Co. v. Stringer, 171 La. 131, 129 So. 731 (1930); Vidal
v. Sterlington Gas Corp., 182 La. 19, 161 So. 6 (1935); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Louisiana Service Comm., 183 La. 741, 164 So. 786 (1935).
* Graduate of February, 1952; presently an officer in the United States
Army, Judge Advocate General's Department.
1. La. R.S. (1950) 30:2-20.
2. The act was upheld as a valid exercise of the police power of the state
and a proper delegation of authority to the commissioner of conservation in
the case of Hunter v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So. 2d 495 (1942), appeal dismissed 320 U.S. 222 (1943).
3. La. R.S. (1950) 30:4(13), 9, 10.
4. Louisiana Gas Lands, Inc. v. Burrow, 197 La. 275, 1 So. 2d 518 (1941).
For a complete explanation of the conservation program and its administra-
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The pertinent provisions of the act are as follows:
Section 8 (b) 5 provides:
"For the prevention of waste and to avoid the drilling
of unnecessary wells, the Commissioner shall establish a
drilling unit or units for each pool. . .

A drilling unit, as

contemplated herein, means the maximum area which may
be efficiently and economically drained by one well, and
such unit shall constitute a developed area as long as a well
is located thereon which is capable of producing oil or gas
in paying quantities."
Section 8(d)11 provides:
". a producer's just and equitable share of the oil and gas
in the pool ... is that part of the authorized production for
the pool . . . which is substantially in the proportion that

the quantity of recoverable oil and gas in the developed area
of his tract or tracts bears to the recoverable oil and gas in
the total developed area of the pool, in so far as these
amounts can be practically ascertained ..
It is provided by Section 9 (a) : 7

"When two or more separately owned tracts of land are
embraced within a drilling unit which has been established
by the Commissioner as provided for in Section 8 (b) , the
owners thereof may validly agree to pool their interest and
to develop their lands as a drilling unit. Where, however,
such owners have not agreed to pool their interests, the
Commissioner shall, if found by him to be necessary for the
prevention of waste or to avoid the drilling of unnecessary
wells, require such owners to do so and to develop their
lands as a drilling unit ....

The portion of the production

allocated to the owner of each tract included in a drilling
unit formed by a pooling order shall, when produced, be
considered as if it had been produced from such tract by a
well drilled thereon ......

Under the above provisions several cases 'have arisen in
tion the reader is referred to the introduction to Title 30 in 17 West's La.,
Stat. Ann. (1950), by S. L. Digby, The Conservation Laws and their Administration.
5. La. R.S. (1950) 30:9B.
6. La. R.S. (1950) 30:9D.
7. La. R.S. (1950) 30:10A, 1OA(1),(b).
8. La, R,S, (1950) 0;9.B,
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which landowner-lessors sued their lessees for cancellation because of the alleged failure of the lessees to comply with the
stipulations of their contracts within the primary term. These
cases can be divided into two main classes: (1) Those in which
the lessor contended that a well, not on the lessor's land but
within a unit in which the lessor's land had been placed, did not
maintain the lease beyond the primary term on the land so
placed in the unit; and (2) those in which the lessor contended
that drilling and production within the unit did not maintain
the lease on land outside the unit, although part of the land under
the lease was actually in the unit.
These problems will be considered in the above order. One
of the first cases in the former category was Hood v. Southern
Production Company,9 in which the lessee had agreed to drill
offset wells if a producing well should be brought in on adjacent
land, in order to prevent the draining of oil and gas from under
the lessor's land. When gas wells were brought in on adjacent
lands and the lessee had made no attempt to drill on the lessor's
land, and in fact, had been prohibited from doing so by the commissioner's unitization orders, the lessor called upon his lessee
to drill thereon and then sued to annul the lease for non-performance. It was conceded that the orders were valid and equitable.
As in most of the cases to be considered here, the dispute involved
the effect of the commissioner's orders upon the obligations of
the parties.
The court held that the offset clause was not applicable to
this case, "especially where the well that is said to be draining
the leased premises is on land within the 640 acre drilling unit
of which the leased land forms a part, and where the lessee is
forbidden by the orders of the Department of Conservation .
to drill a well on the leased premises." "0
To counter this argument the plaintiff had relied upon the
principle that where the performance of a contractual obligation
is precluded by the adoption of a prohibitory law both parties
to the contract are discharged. This contention was appropriately
rejected by the court because there was no obligation on the
lessee to drill offset wells once the plaintiff's land had been
placed in a unit with a producing well therein even though the
well was not actually on the plaintiff's land. The court pointed
9. 206 La. 642, 19 So. 336 (1944).
10, 206 La. 642, 655, 19 So. 2d '36,

,
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out that the lessor was receiving his proportionate share of the
production from the unit and that he would receive no more than
this if the well allotted to that unit had actually been drilled on
his land. The other landowners in the unit would still be able
to share ratably in the production. Therefore, the plaintiff's land
was not being drained of gas without compensation to him.
It is apparent that the offset clause was placed in the lease to
protect the lessor from losing the oil and gas beneath his land to
adjacent lands. Since this was not happening, this clause did
not ripen into an existing obligation. Therefore, the commissioner's order could not render the defendant incapable of performing this obligation.
The court further pointed out that if the lease were annulled
the lessor could not drill on his own land because of the conservation order, and, therefore, the revenue he would receive from
the production of his land would remain unchanged. It was also
held that this lease was signed by the parties with the knowledge
that the commissioner could and might establish compulsory
units and, further, that the deletion of the voluntary pooling
clause by the parties to the lease did not interfere with the
authority of the commissioner.
Substantially the same problem was presented in Hardy v.
Union Producing Company" and in Crichton v. Lee.' 2 In these
cases the plaintiffs, attempted to annul oil and gas leases because
their lessees did not drill wells on the leased premises within
the primary terms of the leases. The same defense was raised
against the claims of both plaintiffs: that the tract covered by
each lease had been placed in a drilling and production unit by
the commissioner of conservation prior to the expiration of the
primary term of the lease, and that a well capable of producing
gas in paying quantities had been completed therein; therefore,
the defendant-lessees argued, this well had maintained the lease
in full force and effect. In the Hardy case, quoted at great length
in Crichton v. Lee, the plaintiff argued that under the terms of
the lease the defendants were merely given the right to go upon
the land and drill for oil and gas and retain the stipulated portion
of any oil and gas recovered, and that, since this had not been
done within the primary term of five years, the lease had expired.
The court held that 'there was no obligation on the lessee to drill
11. 207 La. 137, 20 So. 2d 734 (1944).
12. 209 La. 561, 25 $9. 2d 229 (194),
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a well on the plaintiff's land once it had been placed in this
producing unit. 13 The position taken by the court is more realistic than that urged by the plaintiff. The latter's argument
seems to say that the consideration the lessee bargained for in
entering into the lease was limited to the right to perform the
act of going upon the plaintiff's land and drilling a well. But the
opinions of the court in these two cases convey the thought that
the act of drilling is only the means to an end, and that, basically,
the parties bargained for and gave as consideration stipulated
portions of any production obtained from the lessor's land. Therefore, when production began and the lessor was receiving his
stipulated portion from the pool he got what he had bargained
for and it should make no difference to him whether or not a well
was actually drilled on his land.' 4 The result is that the performance of the obligations under the leases was not prevented
by the commissioner's orders, but, in effect, the obligations were
fulfilled thereby. 15
The court stated that the pooling order literally tied the
hands of the defendant-lessee and prevented his drilling a well
on the lessor's land. This is true, of course, if this language is
restricted to the actual drilling operations on the plaintiff's land,
but it should not be taken to mean that the lessee was prevented
from fulfilling its obligations under the contract.
The case of Hunter Company v. Vaughn16 went one step further, the facts being similar to those in the Hardy and Crichton
cases, except that no production was obtained from the unit
13. The order of the commissioner followed the theory of La. Act 157 of
1940, § 9(a) (La. R.S. [1950] 30:10), providing that "...
for all purposes of the
leases and sub-lease contracts covering the unit, so far as they affect the

production of gas .

.

. shall be treated, developed and operated as one lease,

one unit, one property and one tract; and that drilling operations, drilling

and production on any of the tracts included within the unit shall constitute
drilling operations, drilling and production under the terms of each and
every one of the leases or sub-leases." 207 La. 137, 141-142, 20 So. 2d 734, 735.
In Crichton v. Lee, 209 La. 561, 567, 25 So. 2d 229, 231 (1946), the court quoted
the language of the unitizing order involved therein: ". . . said areas shall
be treated as one lease, one property and one tract, and all oil, gas and other
hydrocarbons within said areas . . . hereby unitized, and the lands, royalties

and lease interests containing same are hereby pooled and communized."
14. Justice McCaleb, speaking for the court in Everett v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 218 La. 835, 850, 51 So. 2d 87, 93 (1950), emphasized this as
follows: "But we think that the drilling which occurred on the unit was
more than a mere fiction. It was an actual extraction of the minerals under
plaintiff's land based upon geophysical and scientific findings. . . . Hence,

what difference, then, that the well does not stand upon plaintiff's property?"
15. La. Act 157 of 1940, § 9a (La. R.S. [1950] 30:10A[1][b]) should be
reconsidered in connection with this.

16. 217 La, 459, 46 So. 2d 735 (1950),
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which included the plaintiff-lessor's land until after the primary
terms had expired. However, since the commissioner's order had
become effective prior to the expiration of the primary term
the defendant contended and the court held that the force majeure
clause prevented the lease from being cancelled because of the
lessee's failure to drill on the plaintiff's tract. The reasoning was
that the order was such an obstacle to performance as to come
within the force rajeure clause. It is submitted that an important factor in this case was the lessee's performance of his obligation as soon as possible; that is, the lessee began construction of
a cycling plant and pressure maintenance system immediately
after the commissioner had issued the order, and production
within the unit was commenced within a reasonable time thereafter. Then the principles of Crichton v. Lee came into play; this
case was cited by the court in holding that the production within
the unit, since it had begun, maintained the lease in full force
and effect. This seems to be a logical and equitable step in the
jurisprudence on this aspect of mineral law. It is interesting to
speculate on what the holding of the court would have been
had the lessee waited an unreasonable length of time after the
expiration of the primary term before commencing operations
to obtain production, especially when considered in connection
with the cases to be dealt with below.
The case of Ohio Oil Company v. Kennedy 17 should be considered with the Crichton v. Lee line of cases, although it involved
a mineral servitude rather than a lease. The controversy was
between the owner of a ten acre tract of land and his vendor,
who. had reserved all mineral rights at the time of the sale, and
concerned the ownership of royalties which had been deposited
in the registry of the court by the lessee. The tract had been
placed in a producing unit by the commissioner's order just prior
to the running of the ten year liberative prescription. The landowner had two contentions: (1) The drilling on the land other
than his, and the pooling order, did not affect the running of prescription; and (2) If prescription did not continue to run, Act 157
of 1940 and the resulting order of the commissioner changed the
law of prescription and thus were unconstitutional. The case of
Crichton v. Lee was a sufficient answer. If the well had actually
been drilled on the tract in question the owner would have had
no complaint under the terms of his agreement with his vendor.
17. 28 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 1946).
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Therefore, as the land was participating in the production from
the well in the unit, it made no difference whether or not the
well was actually on the land. Of course, it is probable that this
result was not contemplated by the vendor and vendee when the
sale and reservation were made several years before Act 157 was
passed. However, the act and order were based on scientific
facts: the land actually was producing oil, and unitization was
effecting the conservation program.
The court stated that "Appellant's demand to be paid the
fund on deposit is inconsistent with his contention that no use
has been made of the servitude.".' 8 If the royalty could be
claimed by the landowner it would mean that the land was producing; but if there was production, prescription for nonuser
would be "interrupted." 19
A relatively recent case, Everett v. Phillips Petroleum Company,20 involved a clause in a lease requiring the lessee to drill
offset wells on the lessor's land when wells were drilled within
a stipulated distance from the lessor's land. In lieu of these offset
wells, under the terms of the lease, the lessee was required to
pay the lessor a certain portion of the former's production from
the wells drilled within the specified distance from the lessor's
land. The problem was novel inasmuch as part of the plaintiff's
land under lease to the -defendant was pooled with lands under
lease to another oil company and a well was drilled within the
stipulated distance from the plaintiff's land. However, the principles applicable here are the same as in the above cases because
this provision was included in the lease to prevent the draining
of the plaintiff's land without compensation to him; and, since the
18. Id. at 507.
19. The language of the court is as follows:

"...

we are constrained to

hold that the completion of the well and continuous production of oil had
the effect of interrupting the running of prescription."

(Italics supplied.) 'Id.

at 508. However, a per curiam opinion in the more recent case of Sanders v.
Flowers, 218 La. 472, 498, 49 So. 2d 858, 867 (1950), states: "Counsel for [plaintiff] contend ... that this court has never considered the question of whether
the orders of the Commissioner of Conservation could validly have the effect
of interrupting or suspending the liberative prescription.
"The conclusion we have reached in this case necessarily reflects that we
have given consideration to this question, and whether, the order of the
Commissioner unitizing the area had the effect of suspending the running of
prescription by placing an obstacle to drilling on defendants' property, or of
interrupting the prescription by the drilling of a producing well within the
unit, in which defendants' property is included is immaterial in this case."
So it seems that the supreme court has left this question unsettled, although
the previous court of appeal case, Ohio Oil Co. v. Kennedy, expressed an
opinion on this matter.
20. 218 La. 835, 51 So. 2d 87 (1950). Pee notq 14, supra,
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plaintiff was receiving his portion of the production from the
unit, this was not happening.
To summarize at this point, there seems to be no doubt as
to the correctness of the decisions which have held that leases
(and servitudes) on all land included in a unit are maintained
by drilling and production at any place within the unit. The
objectives of the conservation program as expressed by Act 157
of 1940 are attained through a valid exercise of the police power
and the rights and obligations under the leases (and servitudes)
affected are not impaired.
The second category of cases set forth above will now be
considered. In Hunter Company v. Shell Oil Company the problem was presented as follows: "When an oil and gas lease covers
land both within and without a drilling unit pooled by order of
the Commissioner of Conservation during the primary term of
such lease, and when production in paying quantities is secured
while such lease is in effect by payment of delay rentals from a
well within the pooled unit but not on any portion of the leased
land, does such production maintain the lease in effect beyond
its primary term as to the part of the land leased which lies outside such unit?" 21 The case of LeBlanc v. Danciger Oil and
Refining Company22 involved substantially the same facts as the
Hunter Company case and quoted at great length therefrom, and
the two can be considered together.
The validity of the commissioner's order and its authority
were not questioned, but the plaintiff contended that the defendant's lease should be cancelled insofar as it applied to the land
not included in the unit, on the ground that the order had the
effect of segregating the land under lease within the unit from
that outside, and. that the well in the unit could have no effect on
the latter tract. It was argued by the plaintiff that no consideration was being received for the holding of the lease insofar as it
covered the land located outside the unit. The court stated that
this argument leads to the conclusion that the order of the commissioner divided the obligations under the lease. The majority
opinion then denied that this division resulted and held that the
lessee's obligation to drill a well was indivisible in its nature
and that the grantor's corresponding obligation to deliver up the
land for development was likewise indivisible. Therefore, if the
21. 211 La. 893, 897-898, 31 So. 2d 10, 12 (1947).

22. 218 La. 463, 49 So. 2d 855 (1950).
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obligation of one of the parties was to be fulfilled in its entirety,
the obligations of the other contracting party must likewise be
fulfilled in whole. 23 Thus, when the lessee performed its obligation by drilling a well within the pooled area, the lessor must
likewise perform; hence, the lease on the entire tract was maintained in full force and effect.
The court assumed that the lessee had fulfilled in whole its
obligations under the lease. The lessee's obligations which are
pertinent here were (1) to drill a well on the lessor's land, and
(2). to pay the lessor the stipulated portion of the production
obtained therefrom. It was seen in the Crichton v. Lee line of
cases that whether the well in the unit was on the lessor's tract
or on other land, it is considered as having been drilled on the
lessor's land. But under the order of the commissioner the land
outside the unit is not considered to be producing and therefore,
the lessor is not receiving any royalty from this land. However,
according to the terms of thd lease there must be production to
maintain the lease in effect beyond the primary term; nevertheless, the decision of the court entitled the lessee to demand full
performance from the lessor. Here the lessor participates in production according to the provisions of the pooling order but is
forced to render performance of its obligations under the terms
of the lease. 24 The plaintiff in the Hunter Company case pointed
this out by contending that it was receiving no consideration for
23. For this doctrine of divisibility the court relied upon Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906), and Cochran v. Gulf Refining Co., 139 La.
1010, 72 So. 718 (1916). Attention should be called to the fact that the doctrine as applied in those cases and in the instant case is more akin to the
common law doctrine of divisibility than to the doctrine as found in Arts.
2108-2112, La. Civil Code of 1870. Under the code divisibility is only applicable
as between the heirs of the creditor and debtor, while, accordihg to the common law concept, "A contract is divisible where by its terms, (1) performance
of each party is divided into two or more parts, and (2) the number of parts
due from each party is the same, and (3) the performance of each part by
one party is the agreed exchange for a corresponding part by the other
party." Restatement, Law of Contracts § 266(3) comment (1932). It seems

that this is more in line with what is involved in the cases now being considered. In other words, the question is: were the obligations of the lessee
susceptible of being divided into several parts, with each part having its
corresponding part tobe performed by the lessor?
24. Art. 2725, La. Civil Code of 1870, provides: "The lessee has the right
to underlease, or even to cede his lease to another person, unless this power
has been expressly interdicted.
"The interdiction may be for the whole, or for a part; and this clause
is always construed strictly."
On the subject of "Assignment and Sublease" see Daggett, Mineral
Rights in Louisiana, 191-196 (1949), and cases discussed there.
Furthermore, under a usual clause in mineral leases the lessee has the
right to assign all or part of the lease to third parties. Oakes, Standard Oil
and Gas Forms, 28-29 (1952).
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the holding of the lease on the land outside the unit. In answer
the court said that "this contention presents only the question of
whether the producing well drilled in the unit. . . is a reasonable,
sufficient, and adequate development of the entire leased premises" and that if there was not adequate development thereby the
plaintiff still had a remedy at law. But it is submitted that this
does not answer this particular contention of the plaintiff. It
seems that what the plaintiff was urging was that the production from the unit would not maintain the entire lease, no matter
how much production was being obtained, that is, that the order
had the same effect as if the land was covered by two separate
leases. The answer of the court would apply only to the sufficiency of the producton to maintain the lease on the land within
the unit.
It has been contended by those sympathetic to the Hunter
Company and LeBlanc rulings that a contrary holding would be
exceedingly harsh on the lessee. First, it is urged that the lessee
would be required to drill more than .one well in order to maintain the entire lease on the plaintiff's land. However, in the
instant cases the units included lands other than those owned by
the plaintiffs. If there had been no unitization order the lessees
would have been obligated to drill at least one well on each of
the tracts of the various landowners. But, under the orders of
the commissioner, one well maintained in effect the leases on
the lands of more than one lessor. Therefore, it does not appear
that under ordinary circumstances any undue hardship would
be placed on the lessee with respect to the number of wells that
must be drilled.
It is further argued by those conforming to the lessee's views
in these cases that inequities would result because the establishment of a unit by the commissioner would cause the lessee to
suffer immediate loss of its lease on the land left outside the unit.
To point up this contention its proponents pose problems similar
to the following: Suppose the lessee holds a lease on 80 acres of
A's land, drills a well thereon and obtains production in paying
quantities. Then, after the expiration of the primary term of the
lease on A's land, this well and 20 acres of A's 80 acres are combined with 20 acres of landowner B's land to form a 40 acre unit.
The contention is that the lessee would be faced with immediate
loss of its lease on A's remaining 60 acres not placed in the unit.
However, it is submitted that this would not occur un-d-F-t1e
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normal contract of lease. In this situation the commissioner's
order has had the effect of stopping production from the land outside the unit; that is, it is scientifically discovered that this land
was not contributing to the production from the well, but that
part of the production was being drawn from under B's land.
Mineral leases customarily contain a clause which provides that
if production ceases after the primary term has expired the lessee
has a reasonable time, or a certain, stipulated time within which
it may begin drilling another well. 25 Therefore, the lessee would
not automatically lose its lease on the land outside the unit.
Justice Hamiter dissented from the majority opinion in
Hunter Company v. Shell Oil Company (and also in LeBlanc v.
Danciger Oil and Refining Company on the grounds expressed in
the Hunter Company case) emphasizing the language of the order
of the commissioner. The dissent quoted the pertinent part of
the order: ". . . drilling operations, drilling and production on
any of the tracts included within said unit shall constitute drilling
operations, drilling and production under the terms of each and
every one of said leases or sub-lease contracts affecting the property included within said unit." The dissent is very persuasive in
stating that by the very terms of the order its application should
be restricted to the land within the unit.
Justice Hamiter also pointed out the important fact that
Hardy v. Union Producing Company and Crichton v. Lee are not
applicable to the basic problem here. He further stated that the
order in the instant case did not prevent the lessee from drilling
on the land in question.
The majority opinion relies upon the Hardy and Crichton
cases in holding that the plaintiff was receiving the same royalties from the well that would be received if the well were actually on his tract. However, this does not answer any of the
problems presented by the Hunter Company and LeBlanc cases.
Even though the well within the unit had been on the lessor's
land it would not be considered as draining oil from that part of
the land not in the unit, and this latter tract should be open to
26
development, independently of the adjoining unit.
25. Oakes, op. cit. supra note 24, at 26.
26. Justice Hamiter also discussed the question of the divisibility of the
obligations of the parties to the lease. In short, he maintained that the doctrine of divisibility did not apply here because this doctrine is only applicable
as between the contracting parties, their heirs or assigns, and the situation

here was caused by the intervention of a third party, the Commissioner of
Conser.ation. But, in the alternative, the dissent said that if the doctrine did
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It seems that the more equitable and logical solution to the
Hunter Company and LeBlanc cases would have been contrary
27
to that of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Of course, it is possible to prevent this uncompensated
tying up of the lessor's mineral rights by the inclusion of a provision in the lease to the effect that if any part of the land leased
therein is included in a unit, production from the unit will not
operate to relieve the lessee from having to pay the yearly
rentals on land not so included; and, further, that unitization
shall not maintain the lease in full force and effect beyond the
primary term on the land not included in a unit. However, the
lessor is not always in a favorable enough bargaining position to
insist upon the inclusion of such a provision in the lease. It is
suggested that the best and most unifying solution would be an
overturning of the present law on this matter. It is very doubtful
that this change will come from the judiciary, especially in view
of the supreme court's firm stand in the initial decision, the
Hunter Company case, and its equally firm adherence 28to this position more than three years later in the LeBlanc case.
The more foreseeable solution is a legislative overruling of
these cases, although at the time of this writing, two bills in the
Louisiana legislature substantially to this effect have already
29
been defeated.
William W. Bell, Jr.
apply here, there was a division of the obligation of the lease. 211 La. 893,
910-912, 31 So. 2d 10, 16 (1947).
27. In his dissent in Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 911, 31 So. 2d
10, 17, Justice Hamiter quoted the following extreme, but useful, hypothetical
proposition from the brief of plaintiff's counsel: "Under the defendants' contention, if a lease contained 1000 acres and only one acre happened to be
placed within a unit and no well was drilled on that particular acre, nevertheless, the entire 1000 acres would be held indefinitely beyond the primary
term but would share in only 1/640 x 1/8, or 1/5120ths of the production from
the unit." (Of course, under the writer's views expressed above, the proposition would become even more extreme because it would make no difference
whether the well was drilled "on that particular acre" or elsewhere within
the unit.)
28. It is possible that there would be substantial grounds for finding the
provisions of Act 157 of 1940 which are pertinent here to be unconstitutional
under the interpretation given to them and the resulting commissioner's
orders in the Hunter Company and LeBlanc cases. One basis for a decision
to this effect would be a finding that the state has impaired the obligations
of contracts without a public purpose. It has also been argued that the
decisions result in the orders being a denial to the lessor of the equal protection of the laws and a taking of the lessor's property without due process
of law.
29. Senate Bills Nos. 180, 181, introduced by Senators Guidry, Barham,
Crothers, and Tooke, Fiftieth Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature
of 1950.

